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EXTRACTS  
FROM  
“A BRIEF SKETCH  
OF THE  
ENGLISH DOMINIONS  
IN  
ASIA.

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BY M. VENUKOF,  
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St. Petersburg,


1875.

Translated from the Russian  
BY F. C. DAUKES; B.C.S.

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SIMLA:

1876:



## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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COLONEL VENUKOF states in the preface to this book that his object in writing the present sketch is to give his readers an insight into the "military-political" position of the British possessions in India. The translator has not considered it necessary to reproduce the entire work which is drawn from English sources, ordinarily accessible to English readers, but has limited the selection of extracts to those portions in which the author inserts any original remarks, or endeavours to draw deductions from facts. The noteworthy points in the original are the prominence which is given to the resources of the Native States\* in India, and the detailed account given of the strength and disposition of the British military forces throughout the three Presidencies, more especially on the North-Western Frontier. Appendix II containing a description of the Trans-Himalayan routes from India on the North-West and East has been translated, with some slight omissions, in full.

*Simla, July 11th, 1876.*

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(\* Appendix I contains a statistical account of the various Native states, which, however, has not been translated, as it is taken from Colonel Malleson's work.)



## A U T H O R ' S   P R E F A C E .

AT a time when the English literature of late years contains an entire series of works regarding Central Asia, and especially regarding the Russian possessions in that quarter, there has not, with the exception of some press articles mostly translated, appeared any work in the Russian language regarding the English dominions in Southern Asia, since the fourth decade of the present century, when the late Golubkof published an inconsiderable series of the works of Bioernstern, Barshi de Panguin, Warren and others. Meanwhile the demand in Russia for knowledge of the present condition of the Anglo-Asiatic Empire increases, and in order, although only partly, to supply this want, I determined to publish the present brief military-statistical sketch of English Asia. It is self-evident that the extent of this volume alone must necessarily exclude a large number of details, but the attentive reader, if he have any experience in this matter, will perhaps not refuse to admit that in composing it I have endeavoured to utilize as large a number of trustworthy

cotemporaneous materials as was possible. A certain personal acquaintance with English Asia has assisted me in discriminating between the bewildering abundance of authorities, and if the reader carries away from this small book a sufficiently clear idea of the Indo-Britannic Empire, and especially of its military-political condition, my object will have been gained. For the benefit of those desirous of extending their knowledge, I have indicated, at the end of the book, a small series of works of acknowledged merit.

M. VENUKOF

MILITARY-STATISTICAL SKETCH  
OF THE  
ENGLISH DOMINIONS  
IN  
ASIA.

I.

*General military-geographical view.*

“THE English dominions in Southern Asia consist at the present time of a large portion of the western peninsula of East India, of a part of Indo-China, on the shores of the Bay of Bengal, of inconsiderable portions of *terra firma* in Malacca and around Aden, and of the island of Perim, the Laccadives, the Maldives, Ceylon, the Andamans, Pulo-Penang, Singapore, Labuan and Hong-Kong, \* \* \*. Besides the above, there are in Hindustan many native princes subordinate to British influence \* \* \*. In order to form a just estimate of the military-political position of the English in these extensive and peculiarly circumstanced regions, it is necessary, at the outset, to remember that a considerable portion

of those last-named either lie on the sea-shore or are surrounded by the sea, and are consequently inaccessible to serious attack from without, since no one Empire of the present day is in a position to enter upon a successful naval strife with England, and still less can count upon successfully landing an army on Anglo-Asiatic soil. The next point to remark is that India, the most important of these territories, is admirably protected by nature from attack even by land, since along a considerable portion of her inland frontier, namely, on the north, stretches the range of the Himalayas, which may with justice be considered as impassable for troops, and which up to the present day not one single conqueror has even endeavoured to cross. It is only on the north-west, from behind the Suleyman mountains, and on the north-east from Indo-China, that British India is vulnerable, provided that the neighbouring empires were sufficiently powerful to execute such an attack; but even here the natural obstacles to the movement of troops are not unimportant, for to the west of the Indus the steppe-like and mountainous localities of Beloochistan and Afghanistan are traversible only by a few well-defined routes, while on the east in Burma and Siam there are no decent

roads, and the country is covered with forests which are frequently entirely impervious.

“This peculiarity, combined with the difficulty of access to the greater part of the Anglo-Asiatic dominions, clearly affords the English a completely reliable guarantee that their sway in these quarters will be lasting. But, none the less for that, is it advisable and necessary to examine the continent of English Asia as the theatre for a war, in which the chances of success will to a great extent depend on the degree to which the opponents of England—be they from without or from within—understand how to turn to their advantage the physical properties of the country, to adapt themselves thereto, and to place the English in a position of being unable to defend the extensive region which they have seized, but which is alien and even hostile to them owing to the composition of the population, and which by reason of its distance from England cannot expect any great support from her. The repeated conquests of India, in whole or in part, by Darius, Alexander of Macedon, by the Afghans, by Timur, Baber, and Nadir Shah, which are matters of history, prove that this country is not altogether so inaccessible from without as at first sight would appear to be the case. With regard to

internal wars and insurrections of the native population, an attempt was made as long ago as the years 1857-58, and the English themselves recognize the fact that the appearance alone of an external enemy upon the soil of India, or even upon her frontiers, would be sufficient to excite a fresh outbreak, and to convert into the theatre of war the whole country, the topographical properties and the natural productiveness of which will clearly influence the issue of the military operations and the general course of events. Hence a slight acquaintance with the physical geography of India is a matter of the first importance before studying the country from a military-political point of view."

Regarding the proceedings of the Survey Department, Colonel Venukof writes :—

"The extensive triangulation and admirable surveys which have been carried out by English engineers in the course of the nineteenth century have produced the result that this country is topographically as well known as a great portion of Europe, and positively better known than for instance Turkey and the northern parts of European Russia."

Regarding the outcome of these operations it is said : " The result has been the publication

of an admirable map in 143 sheets on a scale of six versts to the inch. Several localities moreover have been mapped in even greater detail, and all the navigable rivers and sea harbours have separate maps indicating the depths, &c., and plans. Hypsometrical observations, to the number of many thousand, afford one the possibility of forming a correct judgment as to the superficial formation of the country, while the extensive geological surveys, which have already embraced more than a half of Hindustan, enable one to form conclusions as to the composition of the soil and its mineral wealth."

Here the author gives a general geographical outline of India, especially noticing the absence of any really good harbours on the sea coast, which fact he considers to be partly due to the geological formation of the country and to the effects of the action of the heavy rains on the soil of the mainland.

The deductions drawn from this general view of the geographical formation of the country are—

“(1) that it is absolutely protected from attacks on the north by the enormous range of the Himalayas, (2) that access from the sea is difficult, (3) that according to the topographical

character of the soil the country is divided into two chief parts—the plain on the north and the tableland on the south, the latter of which is undulating and fringed by mountains. Taking into consideration the fact that plains are always more suitable for conquests than hilly regions, and that Northern India is exposed to land attacks, both from the west and also from the east, the natural conclusion is that the most probable theatre of the great decisive contest for the independence of India from the English (if such a contest should at any future time take place) is the plain of Northern Hindustan. That portion of the country therefore and the approaches to it deserve a more minute study."

The author accordingly proceeds to give further geographical details of this portion of India, noticing that the south-western portion of what he calls the plain of Hindustan, namely, that portion situated at some distance from the Himalayas on the left side of the Indus, is in its southern part devoid of any water, whether from rivers or even sometimes from wells. Hence Colonel Venukof concludes that this portion being of the nature of a waterless steppe "can be traversed with ease only by detachments of inconsiderable numbers, which

should preferably be composed of cavalry;" while, on the other hand, the north-eastern portion of the plain, being unusually fertile and intersected by rivers, would present no obstacle to the movements of "numberless armies." The portion therefore of India, most important from a strategical point of view, is the northern half of the Punjab, which is intersected by the rivers Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravee, Beas and Sutlej. "The passage of these rivers is the reverse of easy" Colonel Venuko<sup>f</sup> adds, "and the construction of permanent bridges over them is a very difficult matter, as was shown by the fact of the railway bridge over the Sutlej having broken down in 1872, owing to the large increase of water produced by the rains and the melting of the snows in the Himalayas."

Proceeding now to a brief description of the locality between the Sutlej and the Jumna, and of the Deccan, the author notices the great importance from a military point of view of the "excellent, elevated and slightly undulating plains of Berar, Hyderabad and Mysore, as being localities very productive, thickly populated, and somewhat less hot and moist than the valleys on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel."

Having thus described the general outlines of Indian geography, which are most essential in a military view, Colonel Venukof proceeds to describe the climate, arriving at the natural conclusion that "the winter is the best season of the year for military operations and in the time of peace for camps of exercise, which are actually held at that season." The rains are next described, and then follows a brief account of the harvests, regarding which he writes: "Over the whole extent of the country there are two harvests in the year—one in the summer and the other in the winter—without which the numerous population could not exist. But since the yield of the harvest depends chiefly on the atmospheric supply of water, it is clear that some parts of the country are, on the occurrence of the first failure of rain, subjected to the possibility of a famine. These failures of the crops happen sufficiently often, and involve the most ruinous consequences. Thus in the years 1873—74, the famine in Bengal and Orissa obliged the Government to feed as many as 2,800,000 people for several months, cost the lives of many hundreds, and forced tens of thousands to emigrate to British Burma. In order to satisfy the wants of the starving population, the Government was forced to incur a

loan of 10,000,000 pounds sterling. This same misfortune of the failure of crops occasionally arises from a cause entirely opposite to drought, namely, from floods, which carry away the upper layer of fertile soil, together with the seeds sown in it. The English are earnestly labouring to avert natural catastrophes of this kind, and since the best of all possible measures to this end appears to be a system of canals, which at a time of drought afford artificial irrigation, and on the occurrence of floods carry off the superfluous water, the East Indian Government is devoting its especial attention to this object."

A brief account is next given of the mineral wealth of India "important in a military respect." First coal, which is of the "greatest importance," in view of the development of railroads; next iron, "another mineral important for military operations;" next copper, lead, and tin; the section concluding with the remark that "regarding other minerals and metals it is not necessary here to make any mention, since they have no direct importance from a military point of view."

## II.

### *Gradual expansion of the English dominions in Asia, and the present extent of them, and of the lands in a state of vassalage upon England.*

THIS section gives a brief account of the rise of the English power in India, but contains little of interest. A chronological statement is given, showing the gradual process of annexation, which, on the principle, apparently, that fighting can have no other possible meaning with the English except annexation, culminates with the Lushai country (1871) and Perak (1875)!

Regarding the mode in which these successive annexations have been brought about, Colonel Venukof writes:—

“A great part of these acquisitions has been gained by force of arms, others again have been annexed without war, after the death of their rulers, or by setting aside the latter while still alive. The usual method of thus setting aside the petty native chiefs of India has consisted in the appointment at their Courts of English Residents, *i.e.*, Political Agents, who little by little interfered in all the internal

affairs, got into their own hands the finances of the country, afterwards removed the Raja or Nawab on a pension, and finally completely ousted either him or his successors from the government."

With reference to our relations with the frontier tribes, it is said :

"From the year 1849 when the English established themselves in the Punjab, on the banks of the Indus, and also of the Kabul Darya (at Peshawur), commenced their wars with the neighbouring mountaineers of the Suleyman range, of the Sufed Koh, and on the banks of the Swat river. These wars are almost incessant, and call to mind to some extent our prolonged strife with the mountaineers of the Caucasus, \* \* \*

Almost the same phenomenon is visible on the north and east frontiers of Assam. The Lushai expedition of 1871 was directed against one of such mountain tribes, having their abode to the south of Cachar, while the Duffla expedition of 1874 was organized against the mountaineers of the southern slope of the Himalayas."

Regarding the mode in which the English obtained possession of Aden, the following passage occurs :—

“ From the year 1842 England has had in her possession Aden, which was acquired partly by purchase and partly by voluntary surrender, no regard being paid to the fact that Arabia, the birth-place of Mahomedanism, is considered one of the component parts of Turkey. At the present time the district of Aden, independent of the Turks and populated by Arabs, ‘ who are found on friendly terms with England,’ *i.e.*, under her protection, has already reached an extent of as much as 300 square miles.” This section closes with a statement of the extent of British territory in India, &c., and of the area of the “ nominally independent and directly vassal lands in Hindustan.”

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### III.

#### *Administrative division of English Asia and number of inhabitants.*

AFTER a brief account of the mode in which the government of the various Asiatic dependencies of England is divided between the Colonial and Indian offices, the author proceeds to give the totals of population for the various presidencies of India. In describing the administrative sub-divisions of India, he says :—

“ Generally the administrative construction of British India is sufficiently complicated and does not possess that degree of symmetry in the organization of authorities which we see in European empires. The chief cause of this want of symmetry is to be found in the minute manner in which the land is parcelled out, in its want of uniformity, and in the necessity of imposing upon the Governors of the separate provinces the political charge of neighbouring states. With reference to these last it is necessary to remark that they are assigned to the different presidencies, so that the direction of matters therein depends upon the Governors of the latter, who act through the medium of Residents or Commissioners. The entire number of states in a condition of vassalage upon

England (not reckoning the Maharaja of Nipal, the Ameer of Cabul, and the Khan of Khelat, who are recognized as fully independent) extends to as many as 461, of whom 153 are confirmed in their position by the special patents of Lord Canning, who was Viceroy of India at the time of the sepoy mutiny in 1857—59. Reserving a complete list of these native chiefs for an Appendix, we name here only the most important of them :—

	Number of subjects.
The Nizam of the Deccan, having his residence in Hyderabad	... 10,667,000
The Maharaja of Mysore at Mysore	... 3,500,000
Maharaja Sindia at Gwalior	... 2,500,000
The Gaekwar of Baroda	... 2,600,000
The Maharaja of Marwar at Jodhpore	1,783,000
"      " of Pattiala	... 1,586,000
"      " of Cashmere at Jummoo	1,537,000
"      " of Jeypore	... 1,900,000
"      " of Rewah	... 1,200,000
The Maharana of Meywar at Udeypore	1,162,000
The Maharaja of Travancore at Travancore	... 1,012,000
Holkar of Indore	... 576,000
The Maharao Raja of Ulwur	... 778,000
The Begum of Bhopal	... 663,000
The Maharaja of Bhurtpore	... 743,000
The Raja of Kolhapore	... 534,000
The Maharaja of Bickapeer	... 530,000
The Rao of Kutch	... 500,000
The Maharao of Kotah	... 433,000

The degree of dependence of these chiefs cannot be defined by any general formula, since it varies for different states, extending from the payment of tribute to the obligation to provide auxiliary forces, and even to obey in every respect the British Resident. However, the most independent in their actions are the Maharajas Sindia and Cashmere, the Gaekwar of Baroda, and Holkar of Indore, who receive at official meetings equal salutes with the Governor-General or Governors of the presidencies, while at the same time all of them have English Agents at their Courts. The small states are collected into groups for each of which there is a special Resident or Commissioner. On some occasions when questions of general government or policy have to be settled, the Governor-General or Governor collects the Rajas into Councils or Durbars: but Durbars are for the most part purely of a ceremonial nature, where the representatives of the British power appear in all the pomp of authority, on elephants, under umbrellas, with numerous escorts, &c., &c., whereas the native ruler cannot make use of an umbrella, and the composition of his suite is defined according to his rank. In spite, however, of this, the greater part of the native states maintain their own troops, of which the

total far exceeds the numbers of the Anglo-Indian army—for instance in 1874 the proportion was 5 : 3, or 314,598 men against 189,787.

“From the figures given above it appears that the immediate possessions of England in Southern Asia contain 193,758,080 inhabitants : and that the average over the entire extent of those territories is 4,260 souls to the square mile. This proves that the Anglo-Asiatic country belongs to the most populous in the world. But the distribution of the population varies : the most densely populated of all being Oudh (average 9,974 souls to the square mile), the North-Western Provinces (8,101), and Bengal (7,035), *i.e.*, generally the basin of the Ganges, while the more thinly inhabited are Assam (1,333), British Burma (580), and Sind (695). Since, however, besides the denseness of the population, it is from a military-political point of view important to know also its ethnographical composition, we proceed now to examine this latter point.”

## IV.

### *Tribal composition of the population of English Asia.*

THIS is an interesting section and contains in a few pages a succinct ethnographical account of the various tribes in and around India. Noticing the number of languages and dialects prevalent in India, which the author estimates as not less than two hundred in number, he proceeds :—

“ This circumstance has no unimportant political signification, from the fact that it prevents the Hindoos from uniting together, and consequently tends to the advantage of their alien rulers ; although, on the other hand, it renders the task of administration very complicated to the English, because it is accepted as a rule by the British administration that no one unacquainted with the native languages should be appointed to the Indian Civil Service, which rule is so strictly carried out that an officer acquainted with Mahratti can only serve in the Bombay presidency, one acquainted with Bengali only in Bengal, &c. . This rule is of course not applied in the case of high positions,

officers holding which, *e. g.*, Governor-Generals, Governors, the Judges of the higher grades, and others, frequently have no knowledge whatever of any of the Indian vernaculars, but the various police officials, the Commissioners at Native Courts, Justices of the Peace, Staff Officers, &c., all undoubtedly have a knowledge of, at all events, one native language."

After a further discussion of the various tribes and tongues prevalent in India which make the country "a complete world of its own," the author continues :—

" From a military-political point of view it is important to remark that of all the nationalities of Hindustan, the Mahrattas and Rajpoots alone (and to some extent also the Tamil tribes, who however may be more accurately described as turbulent than warlike) can be numbered amongst the body militant. These qualities of the various nationalities, interwoven as we shall presently see by religious peculiarities, are well taken into consideration by the English in the formation of the native army. Thus, for example, the Anglo-Indian cavalry have amongst their ranks many Rajpoots, while amongst the infantry, on the other hand, the efficiency of the various regiments, and consequently the degree to which they can be utilized.

for this or that service, depends on the predominance in them of sepoys of this or that nationality. \* \* \* \* ”

This section concludes with the following passage :—

“ The sway over all this mass of inhabitants is in the hands of 110,000 Englishmen, of whom not more than 67,000 belong to the military, and only the most insignificant portion have, in the capacity of planters, become settled inhabitants of Southern Asia, for neither can the merchants, nor still less can the officials, be counted amongst the permanent inhabitants of English Asia, since their object is—to enrich themselves during a period of some years' residence, and then to return to Europe.

## V.

### *Religious composition of the population.*

THIS section contains an account of the various religious sects prevalent amongst the native population of India, which is prefaced by the following remark :—

“ Religion has an important influence on the formation and condition of the population of India : also on its customs and prejudices, on the circumstances of the various classes of society, and on the reciprocal relations between the followers of the various doctrines. The priests—being the representatives of the various religions—constitute as of old, the highest class amongst the people and guide their development. The English are forced to recognize the priestly class, which is not unfrequently very illiterate, as owning a power, which the highly educated and wealthy Anglican clergy are far from possessing in England.”

Then follows a disquisition upon the tenets of Brahminism and upon the various changes which they have undergone, together with a short account of the Sikhs and Buddhists. . .

On the subject of the various religious feasts enjoined by the different religions, it is said :—

“ The Brahmins and Buddhists have a multitude of religious feasts, which are observed with pompous ceremonies. But the calendars or lists of these feasts differ in different parts of India—for instance, the Malabar feasts do not correspond in point of time with those of the Deccan. Meanwhile, good policy obliges the English to respect the religions of the natives, and this is one of the causes which tend to complicate their administrative problems. Especially inconvenient is the coincidence of the religious festivals of the followers of the various doctrines in one and the same locality, because in such a case there frequently break out collisions and street brawls, to pacify which great tact and experience is necessary, so as to prevent a universal rising on the part of the whole population against the authorities.”

Here follow some remarks regarding the spread of Christianity, the action of which on “ the soil of Brahminism ” is represented as “ feeble.” On the subject of Buddhism the author writes :—

“ With reference to Buddhism it should be remarked that, being diffused over the whole extent of British Burma it has a political

signification of its own, since the local objects of veneration are deeply respected by the inhabitants of the neighbouring kingdoms of Siam and Burma—for instance the large pagoda at Rangoon, to which great masses repair for purposes of pilgrimage. These religious bonds, which unite the Buddhist population of the whole of Indo-China, keep up amongst them a political sympathy to the detriment of the English supremacy which, for instance, the Burmese Government invariably regards as only temporary. There is a bond, moreover, between the Buddhists and Lhassa, the abode of their great high priest, the Dalai Lama,—a fact which places them with regard to the English in a position somewhat similar to Ireland with her sympathies towards the Roman See and her hatred to England.

“ But if Buddhism has a certain political significance to the English sway in Southern Asia, incomparably greater is the significance which appertains to *Islamism*. Throughout a course of many centuries a considerable portion of the rulers of India professed the faith of Islam. These were the descendants of the Afghan conquerors, or of the commanders of Bâder’s forces, who belonged to various tribes, and were deprived of their authority on the advent of the English.

power. It is clear that this circumstance alone has necessarily created a strong Mahomedan party in Hindustan which is opposed to the supremacy of the British. But this is not all—the Mussulmans, as a rule, regard the English as unbelievers, and are therefore disposed to rebel against their exercising authority over the orthodox. According to the statistics of 1871, their number throughout all parts of India is very considerable, namely, in Bengal 20,664,450, that is nearly one-third of the population ; in the North-Western Provinces 4,189,348 ; in Oudh 1,111,190 ; in the Punjab 9,331,367, or two-thirds of the population ; in the Bombay Presidency 2,847,756 ; in the Presidency of Madras 1,857,857 ; they are also freely scattered about Ceylon, and their entire total amounts to more than forty millions. The depth of their hatred towards the English is proved by the frequent, and almost incessant, assassinations by their hands of various representatives of the English administration, embracing all ranks from private soldiers to Governor-Generals, for Shere Ali who assassinated Lord Mayo in 1872 was a Mussulman fanatic. Dr. Hunter has written a most complete work regarding the Mahomedans in India, and not without sufficient foundation proves them to be the principal

and most dangerous enemies of the English. We remark that the Mahomedans of India are mostly Sunnies, and it is only in Cashmere that there is a large proportion of Shias, which fact occasionally produces in that country sanguinary collisions amongst the inhabitants, sometimes ending, as in 1872, in the destruction of towns. But in the English dominions proper the number of Shias is inconsiderable.

“ Mahomedanism belongs to the religions which, according to the statement of Mr. Lyall, are progressing in India. The chief reason of this consists in the fact that in addition to the purity of idea regarding monotheism, and the permission accorded to polygamy, the Koran teaches a doctrine of complete equality of all classes before the law and before the Deity.

Hence numerous Hindoos belonging to the lowest castes, which are the objects of contempt, readily exchange their religion for that of Mahomedanism.\* Besides this, Islamism is zealously propagated by Hajis, *i. e.*, holy pilgrims who have been in Mecca, and regard it as incumbent upon them to

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\* The census of 1871 showed that Mahomedanism is making progress even amongst the higher classes of the population of India—thus in Oudh 12,807 people, members of such classes, were described as Mussulmans, converted from other religions. —

promote the religion of the prophet. Since the abolition of the title of "Great Mogul," the most important chief in India, who professes Mahomedanism, is the Nizam of Hyderabad, but in Northern India also a considerable portion of the Rajas are Mussulmans. The English by permitting natives at the present time to occupy many Government offices, from that of Justice of the Peace to being a Member of the Governor-General's Council, are endeavouring while so doing to exclude representatives of Mahomedanism, and it is not long ago that the public press in Madras criticized adversely the proceedings of the Governor of that Presidency for having appointed a Mahomedan as head of the police in the town of Madras."

This section closes with a brief account of the Parsees, which it is unnecessary to reproduce.

## VI.

### *Division of the people into classes, and construction of the community.*

THIS section contains an account of the caste divisions of the Hindoo population. The author points out that the origin of caste is hidden in the shades of antiquity, and that the native inhabitants are peculiarly sensitive of any interference with their ancient institutions—a circumstance which “is well understood by the English, who therefore abstain from meddling either with the caste system of the Indian population, or with the organization of the communities.”

The policy of the English is thus described : “From a military-political point of view the division into castes has such an important influence upon the people that the English have hitherto considered it sufficient to attach to their interests the two highest classes, in order to secure themselves from a hostile rising on the part of the masses. This is an object towards which they are at the present time devoting all their energies. Natives of wealth and acknowledged family position, are gladly received as Members.

in the Councils of the various Governors, and are made Justices of the Peace, &c., while not long ago a native of good family was appointed even to the post of Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief. In the army the native officers are chiefly of the Kshatree and Brahmin castes, and although they do not enjoy any real authority, they nevertheless occupy a position entirely distinct from that of soldiers in the ranks, and are important as being the instruments for upholding amongst the latter a feeling of devotion towards the English Government. This is especially the case with those regiments in which the number of English officers is small, and in which consequently the Captains of companies and their Lieutenants are actually natives, and it should further be observed that the number of such regiments is increasing from year to year, owing to the unwillingness of young Englishmen to enter upon military service in India. The Universities in Calcutta and Madras, and the other high schools, where natives receive a European education, are so constructed that young members, especially of the higher classes, enter them, and it is amongst such natives alone that some fairly prominent positions in the administration are afterwards distributed. In order to excite a feeling of rivalry

amongst the representatives of the higher classes in their service to the English Government, the order of the "Star of India" has been established, the members of which may be chosen without distinction from natives and Englishmen. Of the natives, moreover, who are connected with the administration of Government, some, though only a very few—*e.g.*, Ministers of Rajas, and Members of the Council of the Governor-General—have received the title of Baronet.

"But while striving to attract to their interests natives of the higher classes, by removing them from the popular element, and inoculating them with European ideas, the English at the same time are diligently preserving the internal construction of the masses themselves, since they see in this a pledge for peace and quietness."

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## VII—XVIII.

THE next twelve sections do not contain much requiring notice. Section VII gives an account of the prevailing occupations of the natives of India, while Section VIII deals with agriculture and describes the chief crops grown in the country. From a military point of view Colonel Venukof draws the conclusion that “on the occurrence of a war on the soil of East India, the belligerents would not of course experience any insufficiency of provisions for the men, but fodder for horses is abundant only in the north-western portion of India.”

Section IX is concerned with cattle breeding, fishery, &c., in India ; while Section X describes the mineral resources of the country, and concludes with the following remark :—

“Generally speaking, mining industry in British India stands at a low degree of development ; and the English, in their anxiety to secure a market for the products of their own country, take no trouble about the expansion of mining enterprise in India, especially where it requires complicated works similar to those on which such large expenditure is incurred in England itself. The same, moreover, applies

to all the manufactures of Southern Asia. There was a time when India supplied half the world with her cotton goods, while at the present time she supplies her own wants in this respect by purchases from the English, amounting annually in value to 110,000,000 roubles, which the cotton manufacturers of Great Britain are naturally unwilling to forego." 15087

Section XI deals with the manufacturing industry of India, and Sections XII and XIII with internal and external trade, respectively. Regarding the difference in value between the exports and imports the author remarks : " It is clear (1) that the value of the exports from India at the present time is double that of the imports ; (2) that the balance is made good by an enormous sum of money which flows into the country every year from without. This influx of the precious metals, especially silver, has always been a characteristic of trade in India, and is explained to be due, not only to the preponderance of exports over imports, but also to the enormous demand for these metals for the ornaments which natives wear on their hands, feet, head, and round the waist : and also for the trappings of horses and elephants, &c. However, during the last ten years the value of the gold and silver imported has diminished by 3½ mil-

lions of pounds sterling, while their export has increased in value by four-fifths of a million. It is possible, however, to suppose that in time an equilibrium will be re-established, especially if the large payments in silver cease to be made from China in return for opium, which the Chinese are beginning diligently to prepare in their own country in spite of the prohibition of the Government, or at any rate the high duty imposed on fields under poppy cultivation."

The next section, No. XIV, deals with the means of communication in India—roads, railways and telegraphs, while Section XV contains an account of the harbours, canals and irrigation works. The educational system is described in Section XVI, the following deduction being drawn by the author from his statistics : " This general view shows that the means of education available for the people in India are very considerable : that the population avail themselves very extensively of them, and that the English Government, which barely a century ago took the first steps for the conquest of the country, has, even before the completion of that conquest, not been deterred from placing the light of science within the reach of the conquered nation without any enforced restrictions whatever. Some amongst other of the results of this line of action

have been a growing sense of sympathy on the part of the higher classes of the Hindoo population towards the English, and the frequent bestowal of commendation by independent native journals on the British supremacy in India."

Section XVII is concerned with the finances of the country. After giving statistics of the revenues and expenditure for the years 1863—1872, Colonel Venukof concludes by expressing his opinion that in collecting the revenues "the fundamental principle of the English administration consists in a selfish exemption of the wealthy English residents of India from the burdens of taxation, which are diverted to the uttermost farthing on to the shoulders of the native population."

In support of this conclusion the author quotes certain entries from the budget of 1872, namely, the land tax, the tribute paid by native states, and the tax on salt, as being paid exclusively by natives of India, and he adds :

"Thus the English in India take no share whatever in the payment of 73 per cent. of the Imperial Indian revenues, while of the remaining 27 per cent. a large portion, of course, falls upon the natives." ..

Regarding the details of expenditure, the following remarks occur :—

“It is clear that the maintenance of the military forces, which ensure the submission of the natives to the English, costs the natives themselves an annual sum of sixteen million pounds sterling. Adding to this the ten and a half million pounds paid from the Indian revenues in England, we obtain the result that the English absorb a yearly sum of  $26\frac{1}{2}$ . million pounds sterling from the revenues of India, exclusive of the salaries of the numerous officials and the profits made by merchants living in India itself. If the whole of this amount were credited to the Imperial Exchequer of England, instead of flowing into private hands, it would cover more than one-third of the enormous budget of Great Britain,—in other words the whole annual sum now paid by England to the liquidation of the national debt.

“The cost of maintaining the English public servants in India is out of all proportion to the amount paid on a similar account in Europe. The first dignitary of Great Britain, the Lord Chancellor, receives a annual salary of not more than £ 10,000 sterling, while each Governor of the three Presidencies in India draws a net salary of £12,000, and is at the same time provided with a mansion and a summer residence,

the Governor-General receiving the enormous sum of £40,000 sterling. The same grand scale of remunerating Englishmen for their services in India prevails also in the case of the subordinate agents of the Government."

After noticing that the pay of natives employed in the service of Government is meted out with a stingy hand in comparison with that of Europeans, Colonel Venukof continues : "The enormous cost of the maintenance of the English administration and of the army, combined with the occurrence of such unfortunate circumstances as famine, the sepoy mutiny, and in former times also the necessity for military operations against other enemies, has produced in India an Imperial debt which, according to the estimate of 1874, amounted to as much as £116,143,224 sterling. The whole of this debt is represented by long running bonds, on which the highest rate of interest paid by Government does not exceed  $5\frac{1}{4}$  per cent., while the greater portion bear interest at the rate of 4 and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Thus the national debt does not fall heavily on the 190 millions of inhabitants in British India, and the Government has in this way been in a position to lay before the public a budget, not only without a deficit, but also with a surplus, which has contributed to the

permanent durability of its credit. Another important point in favor of the English administration is that, in spite of frequent circumstances of difficulty, it has never once had recourse to the fatal expedient of issuing bonds bearing no interests, *i.e.*, paper money. Hence the monetary system is entirely firm, and India is free from those unfortunate fluctuations in the value of the unit of currency which we see in many European countries."

Section XVIII gives a brief sketch of the system of the executive and judicial administration of India, including the Governor-General's Council, &c. Regarding the mode of conducting the administration in native states, Colonel Venukof writes :—

"The civil administration of *vassal* states is, in the majority of cases, immediately in the hands of the English Residents, who are usually Staff officers acquainted with the native languages. But in some of these states the Rajas themselves select ministers from their own subjects, of course with the consent of the Resident. Last year (1874) the Gaekwar of Baroda endeavoured to lay aside the first minister (Diwan) recommended to him, but the Governor-General insisted on the appointment of the man chosen by the Resident."

## XIX.

### *State of relations between the English and the Natives of India.*

“THE haughty bearing which the English adopt in their intercourse with the native population has long been the subject of unfavorable criticism, and there is no doubt that this treatment constitutes one of the chief causes of the unanimous hatred which the subjugated natives of Hindustan bear towards their masters. There has scarcely been a traveller in India in whose narrative we do not meet with several instances showing the rough treatment which natives experience at the hands of the English, and of the corresponding repugnance which is universally displayed by the whole population of India towards them. Not having the means wherewith to avenge an affront by open force, the natives usually have recourse to poison, and we find in one of the latest authors, Valbezen, an account of a warning given to him by a very well known English General when sitting at dinner in his own house at Allahabad. Even the higher personages in the Hindu community are very prone to have recourse to this means of getting rid of the hated aliens, and it is

well known that in the present year, 1875, a strong suspicion fell on the Gaekwar of Baroda of having determined to poison the local Resident, Colonel Phayre. In order to understand this antagonism, which has all the significance of a political force, it will be sufficient to quote some accounts of conscientious observers regarding the condition of British India, and the best of all such accounts will be those emanating from the English themselves. For instance, Sir John Shore writes\* :—

“One would suppose the principle adopted was, to treat the people as a degraded, inferior race. This feeling at least shows itself daily, and pervades, more or less, every thought and action. Few Englishmen return the salute of a native ; they can hardly bring themselves to speak to them civilly. The slightest fault of a servant is visited, if not, as is frequently the case, with blows, with the most gross abuse ; forgetting how degrading this conduct is to the person making use of such language. The language of Billingsgate is in hourly use towards servants in the situation of butlers, footmen, and even clerks ; and very often for no fault beyond not understanding what their master

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(Shore on Indian Affairs Vol. I, pp. 11, 12. The quotation is given from the original, but the Author's translation of the extract is not very accurate. Trs.)

said, who probably spoke unintelligibly. Servants are frequently beaten and turned away without paying their wages, for the same reason, the fault alleged being insolence ; this being the usual reason assigned, when an Englishman loses his temper and ill-treats his servants without cause.

“ Should a native of rank come to pay an Englishman a visit, on his being announced, the answer often is (in English), ‘ D——the black fellow ; ’ then (in Hindoostanee), to his servant, ‘ Tell him I have not time to see him.’ Should he be admitted, he is received with a negligent return of his salute, often without any at all ; a chair is handed to him, and perhaps a word or two is addressed to him in bad Hindoostanee, without those civilities of speech which are usual among men of rank ; such as addressing him ‘ toom ’ instead of ‘ ap,’ which is much the same as if one English gentleman were to address another, ‘ You fellow.’ And this, perhaps, only if the Englishman is by himself. Should he have one or more friends sitting with him, they usually continue their own conversation in English, and scarcely take any notice of the native. Should one of the company observe that as he had been admitted, it would but be civil to talk

to him, the answer often is, 'Oh, d——the black fellow, I wish he would not come plaguing me; I do not want to see him: besides, I do not know what to say to him; these fellows have never anything to talk about.' Yet the native who is thus spoken of is perhaps a prince, and the descendant of princes; one who is well conversant with the history of India, or, perhaps, for I have known such instances, one who would put to shame most Englishmen by his knowledge of our own British Indian laws and institutions; and from whom much information might be gained on points connected with the government of this country. While probably the Englishman, who thus speaks of him, may be one whose chief conversation is about horses and dogs, scandal, or battalion duty, or promotion, should he be in the army; or consists of anecdotes of his office, should he be a civilian."

"In the last fifteen years, *i.e.*, from the time of the pacification of the sepoy mutiny and the transfer of India to the administration of agents appointed by the Crown and not by the Company, the relations between the English and the natives have, perhaps, somewhat lost their asperity, but only in a very small degree, while at heart there has been no change for the better. If the English are endeavouring at

the present time, as they think, to attract to their side, by various measures, the higher classes of natives, courtesy is far from being included amongst the category of those measures, perhaps because it is a quality far from universal even in England itself. The prejudices of the English with regard to the 'inferior race' remain in all their force, and when, for example, the marriage of a European with a native female takes place (and, still more, in the opposite case, *viz.*, the marriage of a native with a European woman), it is regarded as not only scandalous but also almost criminal. As recently as the year 1873 a Mussulman of Bombay was tried on the charge of having persuaded a young English girl to marry him, for which he appears to have been punished by six months' imprisonment. On the general question as to the state of relations between the conquerors and the conquered in India, whole volumes might be written, all of which, however, would only serve to develop the idea to be drawn from the particulars here given.

"In a military-political respect this popular feeling of active enmity constitutes an important fact, because it shows that in the event of open war between the English and the population of India, the former would have no friends,

and it would be sufficient for an opponent from without to understand how to turn to his advantage this national antagonism to drive the English irrevocably out of Asia."

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## XX.

### *Military-political position of India.*

THIS section opens with a brief sketch of the tribes on the borders of Assam and the Punjab. The author lingers over the frequent outbreaks amongst the frontier tribes and paints the picture in such a way as to leave an impression of perpetual disorder and doubtful security on the mind of the reader. The expeditions against the Nagas and Dufflas are noticed, and also the murder of Major Macdonald at Fort Michni. Regarding the state of the Punjab frontier, the author writes :

“Small collisions occur once or sometimes oftener, almost every year, but they have no serious signification, although proving beyond doubt the exasperation of the mountainous tribes against the English. It should be remarked that the North-Western border of the Punjab is the most unruly of all the frontiers in British India. Here was situated the celebrated Sittana, the focus of Mussulman fanaticism, against which was directed the expedition of 1863. Here, too, along the right bank of the Indus, live the Yusufzais and other mountain tribes, who are also in a high degree fanatical and inclined to .

plunder. Against these was undertaken in the year 1863 the so-called Umbeyla campaign, which was not altogether without its drawbacks to the English : since that time there have been no serious collisions, and on the contrary it is only recently that the British Governor of the Punjab, Davies ' (Sir Henry Davies)' visited these localities accompanied by only a small escort under the pretext of examining some ruins or other."

Tibet is described as a country entirely closed to British influence owing to the jealousy with which it is guarded by the Chinese. The author notices that efforts have been made to open up communications with Tibet. " In July 1871, the Raja of Sikkim despatched a letter to the authorities of Tibet. It was, however, returned with the seal unbroken, and therefore, under the most favourable circumstances, success cannot be expected for some time to come."

The relations between Nipal and England are said to be friendly as evinced by the interview between the "Raja of Nipal, Sir Salar Jung Bahadoor" and Lord Northbrook in 1875, and the desire of the former to proceed to England for the purpose of tendering his thanks personally to the Queen for the

conferment upon him of the Order of the Star of India. "From this side consequently" writes Colonel Venukof "the English need not anticipate disturbances, although the Raja has a store of arms to the number of 80 or even 100 thousand pieces, probably not for war with Tibet."

Under Eastern Turkistan a brief account is given of the mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth and of the conclusion of a commercial treaty, which ends with the remark that at the beginning of 1875 "there was an English Agent, Mr. Shaw, in Kashgar, and a whole party of military engineers and instructors for organizing the military forces of Yacoob Beg."

Afghanistan is made the subject of the following remarks :—

"Shere Ali Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan, is the sincere friend of England, and the agreement of 1872, by which the Russian Government recognized the rights of the Ameer over Budukshan and Wakhan, resulted in strengthening his position, and afterwards served as a fresh inducement to him to draw closer the bonds which unite him with the British Government.

"Shere Ali's own dominions, however, are in a perpetual state of insubordination. In April 1871 his son, Yacoob Khan, attacked Herat,

and in May succeeded in capturing that town by means of treachery, while he put to death the devoted servant of his father, Futtah Mahomed Khan. In August 1871 Yacoob arrived at Cabul, and before the assembled Council expressed to his father his deep repentance, the result being that in October of that year he received the Governorship of Herat. But in 1875 discord of a purely political nature broke out afresh between father and son. Yacoob Khan was desirous that Afghanistan should not be placed in a position of dependence on the Indian Government, which pays the Ameer £120,000 sterling as a yearly subsidy, and provides him with arms, in return for which the Government obliges him to keep up an army in case of war with Russia, and to maintain in Cabul a Political Agent for the purpose of keeping an eye upon the acts of the Afghan Government. Yacoob was also dissatisfied because his father had nominated his younger brother, Abdulla Jan, as the heir-apparent to the throne. In consequence of this the troops of the opponents confronted each other near Candahar and Girishk ; but before blows were struck, Yacoob Khan agreed upon an interview with his father at Cabul, and on arrival there was placed under arrest.”

The following account is given of Beloo-chistan:—

“The Khan of Khelat is the Ruler of Beloo-chistan—a region lying between India and Persia—the good government and peace of which, as in the case of Afghanistan and the states of Turkistan, is a matter of great importance to the British Government. Unfortunately Beloo-chistan has been for a long time disturbed by internal disorders. The present Khan ascended the throne in the year 1857, and from that time his dominions have been the scene of continuous disturbances owing to the discontent of the national Chiefs, and the desire of two of them, the Jam of Lus and the Governor of Kharan, to gain the throne. The feudal Chiefs, in the course of time, have lost a portion of their authority, and this has been the cause of their perpetual discontent. The presence on the frontier of the English authorities restored the peace, and relieved the Khan from the necessity of relying upon the military forces of his own vassals, because the subsidy received from the English enabled him to keep up mercenary troops and to assume an independent position. In March 1872 Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, appeared as an arbitrator in the disputes between the Khan of Khelat and his

vassals on the occasion of a meeting at Jacobabad. He resolved that the confiscated lands should be restored to their owners, but that the latter should for the future be submissive servants of the Khan, and should return the plundered property to the people who had suffered during the insurrection, whether merchants or agriculturists. This settlement restored the peace, but not for long. In 1874 the English Agent at the Khan's Court was obliged to leave Khelat, where death threatened him, and from that time the Khan's subsidy has been withdrawn, while this has tended to weaken his authority and to produce fresh disturbances in Beloochistan."

The following remarks occur under the head of Burma :—

"Of late years this empire has given the English no little anxiety for various reasons. Being occupied personally in commerce, the King of Burma issued a proclamation to the effect that all merchandise should be sold directly to him and to his agents in quantities far exceeding the real demand, his object having evidently been to take possession of the market, and effect the ruin of the merchants. The King also advanced money on loan to the agriculturists on condition of repayment in kind,

so that the merchants experienced the greatest difficulty in purchasing rice, and trade almost entirely came to a stand-still. By devoting himself to these operations, the King clearly laboured under the impression that he was thereby fulfilling his duties ; but he has been convinced by the arguments of the English Political Agent, and trade has returned to its old channels, accommodating itself to the laws of supply and demand. In 1872 the King despatched an embassy to England without consulting the Political Agent, in the hope of opening direct communications with Her Majesty's Government, and thereby augmenting his personal prestige. In this he succeeded, and received in April 1872 a reply in writing from the Queen. In 1873 a permanent boundary line was established with Burma, but in 1875 disputes arose regarding the southern portion of it, in consequence of which Sir D. Forsyth was despatched from Calcutta to Mandalay and succeeded in adjusting the matter. At the same time a question arose regarding the route to China *via* Burma. The English had despatched a large scientific commercial mission to Yunnan, but on the Chino-Burmese frontier one of the members of this mission, Mr. Margary, was murdered, owing

to which the expedition broke up. The Anglo-Indian Government endeavoured to impress upon the King of Burma the necessity for allowing British troops to pass through his dominions in order to punish the culprits, but without success, and at the present time the question regarding routes through Burma to China remains in its former condition, although the English have used every endeavour to get these roads opened up.

There is another semi-political event connected with Burma which is not devoid of interest, *viz.*, the offering made by the King in 1871 of a valuable state umbrella to crown the great Buddhist pagoda at Rangoon, where the umbrella was set up at a height of 388 feet. The political significance of this, which was clearly a purely religious act, consists in the fact that similar ceremonies on the part of the King took place in 1755 and 1774 when the Burmese authority was restored in Rangoon after some insurrections. The ceremony attracted an enormous mass of people, and showed clearly the close moral connection which exists between Burma and the provinces forcibly taken from her by the English."

Here follows a brief notice of the native states in India, which are described in greater

detail in an Appendix. Regarding Baroda the following passage occurs :—

“In Baroda the local Raja or Gaekwar in the year 1874 took upon himself to oppose the appointment at his court of a Parsee Diwan, who was recommended by the British Resident. But Lord Northbrook supported the Resident, and the Parsee entered upon the duties of his office, while from that time the position of the Resident, Colonel Phayre, was one of mortal danger ..... Accordingly in February 1875, a judicial process was issued against the Gaekwar, who was arrested ; but the investigating Commission did not pronounce him guilty of an attempt at poisoning, and meanwhile public opinion in India and in England itself severely condemned the display by the East Indian Government of an intention to destroy the independence of Baroda. Lord Northbrook, in order to extricate himself from this position, deprived the Gaekwar, Mulhar Rao, of his throne, but set up a Native Chief of Baroda in the person of a young son of a previous Gaekwar. It is unnecessary to add that this youth has been placed under the guardianship of a British Resident.”

A description is next given of the Kooka disturbances which occurred in the Punjab in ..

1872, and of the collisions which took place in the North-Western Provinces between the Hindoos and Mahomedans on the occasion of the Mohurrum at Bareilly (1870) and Morabad (1872). The section concludes with the following account of the arrest of the pseudo-Nana:—

“ In 1873-74 the native states of India, who naturally still nourish projects for freeing themselves from the supremacy of the English, were deeply moved by news regarding the surrender by Maharaja Sindia of the Nana Sahib, a former Mahratta Peshwa, who appears to have taken refuge in Gwalior after a life of perpetual wandering since 1859. The imaginary Nana Sahib was arrested, but the sequel proved that there had been a mistake as to the personality of the arrested man. This surrender damaged Maharaja Sindia only in the opinion of natives, and after this treachery to the national cause, even his own troops showed a disposition to refuse to obey his orders, while in Poona the people warned him not to show himself in that old capital of the Mahrattas.”

## XXI.

### *Details regarding the military strength and resources of the English.*

THIS section contains an account in great detail of the strength and disposition of the English forces throughout India. The number of cavalry, infantry, and artillery at each station in the three presidencies is given, and also an account of the new system on which barracks are erected for European soldiers. It does not appear necessary to reproduce all these details, which are taken from English sources, and are un-accompanied by any original remarks. The chief points noticed by the author will be seen from the annexed extracts to be :—

- (1) the fact of the numerical strength of European soldiers in India having steadily decreased of late years ;
- (2) the smallness of the proportion borne by the cavalry to the infantry—the former being only 13 per cent. of the entire strength of the available troops, and also the numerical paucity of European officers in native regiments ;
- (3) the weakness of the garrisons at the Presidency towns of Madras and Bombay, and

the fact that much remains to be done before the larger seaports of British India can be considered as safe from attack by sea.

The numerical decrease in British troops of late years is thus noticed :

“The gradual decrease in the number of English troops from the beginning of the year 1860 is very clearly shown in the statements inserted in the ‘Statistical Abstract’ for 1871 : thus—

In 1859 the number was 106,200	In 1865 the number was 71,880
1860           ,       ,   92,866	1866           ,       ,   66,814
1861           ,       ,   84,294	1867           ,       ,   65,467
1862           ,       ,   78,174	1868           ,       ,   61,879
1863           ,       ,   76,085	1869           ,       ,   64,858
1864           ,       ,   74,961	1871           ,       ,   60,632

Regarding the constitution of the entire forces, European and Native, the paucity of cavalry, and the general disposition of the troops, the author remarks :—

“Of the general total of the Anglo-Indian army two-thirds are natives and only one-third British. \* \* \* In the sepoy regiments the number of English field officers is very inconsiderable, being less than three to a regiment. Staff officers on the contrary are very numerous, so that measures have recently been taken to cut down their numbers.           \*       \*

The infantry, the total of which amounts to

148,267 men, constitute 77 per cent. of the whole army, while the cavalry amount to 13 per cent., and the artillery to 6 per cent. Thus in spite of the fact that India is an open country (little wooded) the number of cavalry there is small, and of British cavalry particularly so, the latter being less than 2 per cent. : this is a circumstance of no small importance in the event of the breaking out of a rebellion, because it would be no easy matter to crush such a disturbance in its infancy. However, this deficiency in horsemen is partly made up for by the facility which exists for moving the infantry by means of railroads.

“The general rule followed with respect to the distribution of the troops in India is, that where there are British soldiers, there are also a still larger number of natives, in the proportion of one British soldier to two sepoys. But there are also places of less strategical importance, where native troops only are stationed. Throughout almost the whole of Bengal to the North and East of Calcutta, and also in Assam, with the exception of the small station at Darjeeling, there are no European soldiers, the peace of the Eastern frontier being preserved by 4,800 sepoys without cavalry or artillery, and also without any local police force.”

After describing in detail the various stations in Bengal, Madras and Bombay at which troops are stationed, Colonel Venuko<sup>f</sup> sums up the result in the following passage:—

“Thus the general geographical disposition of the British infantry (the chief forces of the English in India) is as follows: 11,600 men in the valley of the Ganges between Calcutta and Umballa, 2,500 men between Lahore and Peshawur, 6,800 men in Central India, and 950 near the mouths of the Indus. Along the western coast from Deesa to Belgaum are distributed 5,500 men, and on the Malabar Coast 880. On the Eastern side of the peninsula including Mysore, the number of troops is 3,300, exclusive however of the detachment at Trichinopoly. The completion of the present system of railroads will unite all the British military detachments except that in Sind, by means of rail communication.”

Regarding the health of the troops the following passage occurs:—

“With reference to the sanitary condition of the English troops in India, it may be remarked that in the course of 1871 the number of deaths was 1,063, *i. e.*, an average of 55.6 per mille.\*”

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\* “In the Russian army the average is 15 per mille. Such is the influence of a tropical climate on Europeans.”

The native troops, the author observes, differ from the European both in uniform and equipment. "The former is much less close fitting and cheaper than that worn by European soldiers, consisting of a compromise between the European and Native military costumes: with regard to the latter, it may be remarked that although the English Government for its own especial ends supplies the sepoys with arms far superior to Asiatic weapons, still it is made a rule to give the European troops arms of a still better pattern. Thus while at the present time the Europeans have Martini-Henry rifles, Sniders only are distributed amongst the natives, and then with the smallest possible number of cartridges. In order to give the British troops a moral preponderance over the natives, the former are never deputed on earth-works or other building operations, which might lower them in the eyes of the Hindoos. Hence the sappers in India consist not of Englishmen but of sepoys."

In a previous passage in this section the author notices the slender strength of the garrisons at Bombay and Madras, regarding the former of which he writes:

"And thus in a town with 644,000 inhabitants, chiefly natives, who have been subdued

by the force of arms,—a town moreover which is open to attack from without by the sea,—there is stationed a garrison of only one British battalion.”

Regarding the defences of the “richest harbours of British India,” Colonel Venukof notices that much remains to be done before they can be considered as secured from attack by the sea ; “but” he adds “the English hold the opinion that it is useless letting this want trouble them. In the event of war, they would manage to erect temporary means of defence, while, on the other hand, to construct expensive permanent defences would, independently of the large cost involved thereby, be imprudent in the present age with its rapid improvements in the means of attack.”

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## APPENDIX I.

### *The Native States of Hindustan.*

This Appendix contains a fairly detailed account of the Native\* States in India, their population, revenues, and military forces, and also a brief notice of the tribes on the North-Western Frontier. The statistics are apparently taken from Colonel Malleson's "Native States of India," but are unaccompanied by any original remarks, and have not therefore been translated.

\* Some remarks are also devoted to Nepal, in which the author for the second time falls into the error of speaking of the Maharaja of Nepal as "Sir Salar Jung Bahadoor."

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## APPENDIX II.

### *Routes from Hindustan on the North-West and East.*

“India is surrounded by extensive mountainous regions on the North-West, and therefore the roads leading thence to the Aralo-Caspian cavity are all difficult of passage. At the same time, the further we proceed to the East, the higher the mountains become, while the width of the range decreases. The roads on the contrary, lying to the West, or more correctly to the South-West, pass through localities with mountains, the altitude of which is less, but which cover a wide expanse of country, and are frequently rocky, devoid of any vegetation, and intersected by plains having the character of steppes. It may therefore be said generally that it is impossible for brisk intercourse to exist between India and the regions to the North of the Hindu Kush. To this it should be added that inasmuch as tribes, distinguished by their turbulent and predatory character, have their abodes along the existing routes, it is probable that Turan and India, divided as they are chiefly by the Hindu Kush, will never be closely connected with each other until such time as that range becomes the boundary between the possessions of the two civilized powers—Russia and England”.

A list is inserted here of the following routes, the details of which, being almost entirely taken from English sources, are not translated:—

- (1.)—From Kurrachee *via* Khelat to Quetta.
- (2.)—From Hyderabad *via* Larkhana to Khelat by the Mulla Pass.
- (3.)—From Shikarpoor *via* the Bolan to Candahar
- (4.)—From Dera Ghazi Khan to Candahar *via* Sewestan.
- (5.)—From Dera Ghazi Khan to Ghuznee.
- (6.)—From Dera Ismail Khan to Ghuznee, and thence to Candahar and Cabul.
- (7.)—From Candahar to Herat.
- (8.)—From Attock to Cabul, and thence to Khulm.
- (9.)—From Peshawur to Budukshan.

Regarding the routes from India into Central Asia, the author reproduces the following remarks, which he communicated to the *Invalide Russe* in the end of the year 1874 and the beginning of 1875:

“ *Khelat and Quetta*.—In the Anglo-Indian journals the idea persistently continues to be ventilated regarding the absolute necessity for the occupation by English troops of Quetta, which is situated on the Northern border of Beloochistan, and not less than 313\* versts from Shikarpoor, the nearest town of the British possessions in India. The object of such an occupation is declared to be the necessity for securing British India from possible attacks on the North-West (from the side of Herat and Candahar), which are supposed to threaten her sooner or later in the future.

\* (One verst is equivalent to two-thirds of an English mile.—Tr.)

The preference, on the other hand, which is displayed for Quetta as being most fitted for this object, is founded on the fact that this little town is situated at the Northern extremity of a sufficiently long defile, through which troops, on their way from Candahar to Shikarpoor, would be forced to march, and which is called the Bolan Pass.

So meagre is the information which is generally available to Russians regarding these regions, that a brief description of them may not be superfluous in order to appraise at their right value the solicitations expressed by the Anglo-Indian press. Quetta, as has just been said, lies at a distance of 313 versts to the North-West of Shikarpoor. According to the description of Conolly, this capital of the Beloochistan District of Shawl is a small town containing 400 houses little better than huts. It is surrounded by a mud wall, and has three gates. The citadel or fort is situated apart on a hillock, so that the Hakim, who has his abode there, can, without difficulty, give forth from the ramparts his verbal orders to the extreme ends of the little town which lies below. The inhabitants are Afghans, Beloochees, and natives of India who carry on a trade in saffron, assafœtida, and other products of the neighbourhood. Their chief source of profit, however, is not in trade, but consists in the payments made by passing caravans from Herat and Candahar, which supply themselves here with provisions, particularly with fruits. The valley, surrounding Quetta, has not a greater width than twelve versts, and being situated 5,200 feet above the sea, is characterized by coldness in the winter and by the freshness

of the nights in summer, although in the day time it is hot. The road thither from Shikarpoor leads at first along a plain bordering on the Indus, and afterwards over the second half of its length along mountains. The portion of the plain, which forms the boundary between India and Beloochistan, presents also the appearance of a sandy steppe, while further on, to the North-West, spreads the rich oasis of Kach-Gandava, the pearl of the dominions of the Khan of Khelat, if only he really possessed here any sort of authority except that secured to him by the guarantee of the English, *viz.*, the right of collecting a small tribute from the local Governors of Bagh, Gandava, Kotree, Lehri, Dadur, and other places. The most important town of Kach-Gandava on the road from Shikarpoor to Quetta is Bagh, the environs of which are sufficiently thickly populated, although the cultivation of the soil is only possible by means of artificial irrigation, the heat from April to August being so intense as to convert every unirrigated spot into a complete wilderness. Bagh, according to the testimony of Masson, has as many as 600 houses, and is surrounded by castellated walls : considerable bazaars, moreover, are held there, though the trade is entirely in the hands, not of the natives of the country, but of Indians. The natives throughout the whole of Kach-Gandava are Jâts (probable descendants of the Goths, who once laid waste Europe,) Rinds. (Beloochees) and Brahuis. The last-named are ~~now~~ arrivals in the region, having established themselves therein as recently as the time of Nadir Shah, *i. e.*, the middle of last century. At a distance of twenty versts to the North-West of Bagh, the traveller approaches

the outlying hillocks of the Hala range of mountains, and again at a distance of thirty versts further on, near Dadur, enters the defile, which stretches along the well-known rivulet of Bolan, and is therefore called the Bolan pass. The passage of caravans here is attended with difficulty, owing to the boulders and frequent ascents and descents; but it would nevertheless be free from danger were it not for the robberies of the neighbouring Beloo-chee tribes. It is this prevalence of robbery that creates, more than any thing else, doubts in the minds of those Anglo-Indian strategists who are in favor of the immediate occupation of Quetta. A detachment of troops, stationed at Quetta, would be completely cut off from communications with Hindustan; while, on the other hand, if it should be determined to provide a series of *étappes* for securing those communications, it would be necessary to build an entire line of fortifications. But since the Bolan pass with all its attendant difficulties stretches over a distance of 135 versts, and robberies could be committed unobserved within very short distances from the posts, it is clear that the strategical question regarding a line of fortifications resolves itself into a series of problems, the successful solution of which must require numerous troops and a large expenditure of money.

Thus the realization of the agreement, made with the Khan of Khelat by a special treaty in 1854—the occupation of Quetta by English troops—appears by no means an easy matter from the side of Shikarpur. But since the pessimism of Anglo-Indian strategists, who since 1859 have been pining for want of military operations, compels them persistently to harp about

Quetta, two other routes to this "stronghold" occupy their attention. Both these proceed by Khelat, which lies 161 versts S. S. W. of Quetta, and is united with the latter by means of several roads. The first route leads from the capital of Beloochistan to the South-East, in the direction of Larkhana, near the Indus, while the second stretches directly to the South, and is terminated by the Indian Ocean at Kurrachee (466 versts from Khelat). But even on these routes nature has provided a sufficiently unpleasant opposition to the patriotic zeal of the Anglo-Indian strategists. According to the natural formation of the plateau of Beloochistan, which falls suddenly on the side of India, the rivulets, which take their rise in it, before reaching the valley of the Indus, force their way by means of deep beds through the declivity, and the nearest road from Khelat to the English dominions is through the defile of Mulla, which is no better than the Bolan, and extends over a distance of 131 versts. On the neighbouring mountains wander the same Beloochee tribes; and although it may be true that the Khan of Khelat is in these parts more interested in maintaining the security of travellers, nevertheless his good intentions in this respect will hardly be so great in the case of English soldiers and military transports as with caravans which pay customs duty. To this it must be added that the construction of a military *étappe* route to Quetta, *via* Khelat—whether through the Mulla Pass or from Kurrachee—would first of all clearly entail the location of an English garrison in the very capital of Beloochistan,—a measure which would naturally be acceptable neither to the Khan nor to his subjects.

Besides this, the route from Kurrachee is disadvantageous to the English themselves owing to its length—627 versts.

*Ghuznee and Candahar.*—In the foregoing sketch attention has been called to one of those outlying points in the North-Western border tracts of India, the occupation of which enters into the plans of English officers, who are seeking the means whereby to guard Hindustan against invasion from Central and Western Asia. A few words may now be said regarding another similar locality, the importance of which has already been practically proved in the expedition of the years 1838-1842, *i.e.*, Candahar. This town is situated in the very middle of Afghanistan, and is such a complete focus for the roads connecting the Eastern and Western parts of that Khanate, that it is impossible to avoid passing it—whether going from Cabul to Herat, and still more from Peshawur, Cabul and Ghuznee to Seistan, or from Quetta to Herat. Built in the form of an irregular square, Candahar is surrounded by a wall twenty-seven feet in thickness at its base. Along this wall, which is 2,700 *sajhen*\* in length, are distributed 54 semi-circular towers. The water in the town is brought by means of “aryks” from the river Argandab, and fills a series of tanks, three *sajhen* in width and ten feet in depth. The citadel and fort, in which formerly the independent rulers of Candahar had their abode, are now in ruins. The houses in the town are of mud and stone, not uncommonly double-storied, surrounded by high walls, in the midst of which are court-yards and sometimes gardens and fountains. The altitude of the

\* (A *sajhen* is equivalent to seven English feet.—*Tr.*)

region, 3,260 feet above the sea level, causes the climate of Candahar to be raw in the winter, while in the summer during the day the heat is excessive, the sun in June being only nine degrees from the zenith. The population of the town, numbering perhaps as many as 100,000, is composed of Afghans, Persians, Uzbeks, Beloochees, Jews, Indians, and others. Its slight attachment to the present ruler of Afghanistan is proved by the severe military-police measures undertaken by command of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, in the autumn of 1874, on receipt of the news of the insurrection of Yacoob Khan of Herat. A great part of the Candaharees are occupied in trade. Caravans proceed thence in 18 days to Herat and in 15 days to Cabul, while couriers perform the same distances in half the time. The two chief roads to India are the direct route to Dera Ghazee Khan, and that *vid* Ghuznee to Dera Ismail Khan. The first is 503 versts in length and proceeds along the steppes and mountains of Sewestan, which are occupied by nomadic Afghans (Pathans), who love to devote themselves to plunder not only on the road itself, but also towards the Indus in British territory. The second route is circuitous, but somewhat less dangerous. As far as Ghuznee the traveller follows the river Tarnak, keeping the tream on his right, and on his left the declivity by which the elevated highlands of Afghanistan fall into the valley of the river. The road from Candahar rises steadily until it reaches a pass near Chahardeh, which is 7,000 feet above the level of the sea. Ghuznee itself is situated still higher, namely at an altitude of 7,750 feet, and is surrounded by a wall two versts in

length and five *sajhen* in height. Its citadel, which occupies the northern part of the town, is situated on an eminence which commands the city, and in 1839 was one of the chief supports of the English who occupied the whole of Afghanistan. The number of the inhabitants of Ghuznee at the present time does not exceed 10,000 souls, but formerly this was the extensive capital of the empire of the Ghaznivides, the ruins of which are up to the present time visible even at a distance of more than  $4\frac{1}{2}$  versts to the North-East of the town. Here, as in Candahar, there are permanent warehouses for English goods and a regular mounted post carries thence the correspondence of merchants to India.\* Communications with Cabul are very frequent, the latter town being situated only 108 versts to the North, and since Ghuznee lies on the only good route from Cabul to Candahar, it naturally possesses a strategical importance, the value of which was fully understood by the English in 1838, when they took this town and carried away from it the famous carved gates which are now in the British Museum. At the same time Ghuznee lies much closer to the banks of the Indus (308 versts) than Candahar, and therefore can be brought into much closer permanent connection with the English dominions than either the former town or Quetta. It may, therefore, be taken for granted that if at any time the English are forced, for purposes of attack or defence, to cross the Suleyman range, Ghuznee will be the first point which they will occupy. Having established

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\* In Bradshaw's "Handbook to the Bombay Presidency," page 249, it is said that there is a post office also in Candahar, which is of course English.

themselves here, they would command both Cabul and Candahar. However, this occupation of Ghuznee will also not be wanting in difficulties of its own, if only the English appear there in any other character than that of the protectors of Afghanistan, who have come at the request of the natives themselves. Firstly, in order to reach Ghuznee, it is necessary to pass through the Gomal defile which is completely similar to the Mulla and Bolan passes, *i.e.*, it is formed by the narrow valley of the Gomal rivulet intersecting at great depth the rocky mass of the highlands of Afghanistan. Secondly there are no inhabited points on this route from Derbend itself *i.e.*, over a distance of nearly 270 versts, while the Wuzcerees have their nomad abodes along the neighbouring mountains—an Afghan tribe with whom the English carry on incessant warfare both in the mountains and also in the valley of the Indus, whither the robbers penetrate for purposes of cattle-lifting. And it is not only with regard to Christians like the English, but also to Mahomedan merchants conveying their merchandise through the Gomal pass, that the Wuzcerees act like perfect fiends. Falling on the caravans from behind some rock or other, they endeavour to kill the men and to seize the camels laden with goods; while, if this is impracticable, their object is at least to kill as many animals as possible, in order that the merchants may be forced to throw away part of their packs. The merchants, in their turn, hate the tribe to such a degree that if a Wuzcerce falls into their hands as a captive, his hair is plucked singly and he is afterwards covered while still alive with stones, in order that the pain of death may be the more excruciating. To have at one's back a

mountain pass occupied by such brutal enemies is not altogether convenient, and therefore English strategists, before finally settling upon this line of action, are probably thinking deeply of its possible consequences, having a seasonable remembrance of the retreat in 1842 through the defile of Khurd Kabul.

*Peshawur and the Punjab Military Line.*—In 1849, at the time of the subjugation of the Sikh Empire in the Punjab, the English conquered also Peshawur, which had been formerly an Afghan possession, but had been taken from the Afghans by the Sikhs. The object of such an annexation of country along the right bank of the Indus, which river constituted the natural North-Western boundary of Hindustan, was self-evident: the English desired to command the outlet of the valley of the Kabul Darya, through which the greater number of conquerors had penetrated into India. Since that time Peshawur has been converted into a strong fortress, constructed according to the rules of European fortification, while at the same time the whole neighbouring valley along both the right and left banks of the Kabul Darya has been surrounded by fortifications, which give the Peshawur District the character of an extensive fortified camp, like Metz or Paris, or, more accurately, the well-known parallelogram of Northern Italy. The following particulars regarding this region explain its present condition from a military point of view.

The river Kabul Darya, which falls into the Indus at a distance of about one verst and a half above Attock, in its lower course irrigates a valley eighty versts in length and of the same width, open only on the East

and surrounded on the other sides by mountains. Along the upper course of the river there is no outlet into Cabulistan, because rocks closely press upon the river bed, and in consequence of this the road to Jelalabad takes a more southerly direction through the Khyber defile, which consists of two large gorges meeting at their summits and surrounded by rocks. This defile of the Khyber is in the power of Afghan tribes, sufficiently barbarous and warlike, so that not only does an Englishman not dare to show himself there, but the movement of Afghan caravans from Cabul to Peshawur is not unfrequently entirely stopped. Of course, in 1842, the English force under the command of General Pollock succeeded in penetrating through the Khyber pass, but this was only because the natives did not show any serious opposition to their progress; on the other hand, according to the general opinion of English officers, a mere handful of well-armed soldiers could in this pass hold at bay a numerous corps, which would not be able to deploy its forces in order to crush the defenders by its numerical superiority. The English, with reference to the Khyber defile, limit their action to the occupation of the fort of Jamrud, which is situated at a distance  $4\frac{1}{2}$  versts in front of the outlet of the pass and 18 versts to the West of Peshawur. Other similar forts have also been erected by them opposite the remaining outlets from the mountains on to the plain of Peshawur, namely—

*South of the Cabul Darya—*

Fort Bara—15 versts to the South-West of Peshawur, near the Bara streamlet, the valley of which leads to the Sufedkoh mountains, inhabited by very warlike tribes.

**Fort Mackeson**—due South of Peshawur, at a distance of about 25 versts, near the foot of the same Sufedkoh mountains and on the route to Kohat.

**North of the Cabul Darya—**

**Fort Michnee**—almost on the river, built for the purpose of observing movements along the river bed, the distance of the fort from Peshawur being about 22 versts.

**Fort Alamzai**—about 6 versts E. N. E. of that before mentioned.

**Fort Abazai**—10 versts further North, on the river Swat or Punjkora, the valley of which is occupied by warlike Yusufzais.

**Fort Jung**—12 versts to the North-East of that before mentioned, and approximately 30 versts from Peshawur. All the four last named forts, which are connected one with the other, protect that part of the Peshawur plain which is most liable to the attacks of the neighbouring mountaineers. Near Fort Michnee an English officer named Macdonald was murdered in 1873 while on a sporting expedition in the hills.

**Fort Toru** is situated at some distance from the mountains, not more than 12 versts from the Cabul Darya, and 50 versts from Peshawur to the North-East. Beyond this fort and in the same direction lies the Umbeyla pass, well known from the time of the campaign of 1863 against the Mahomedan fanatics, to a great extent emigrants from Hindustan, who had collected round the Mahaban mountain in the settlements of Sittana, Malka, Lalu, &c.

On the left bank of the Indus, at a distance of 75 versts above the point where it receives the Cabul

Darya, lies the fort of Torbela, the object of which is to keep an eye on the mountaineers living further to the North in the circles of Chamla, Buner and in the Black Mountains.

Lastly to the system of forts which surround the Peshawur plain must be added also Attock, although it is situated on the left bank of the Indus and in a region which is not liable to any direct attacks. Possessing Attock, the English command both the bed of the Indus, the mouth of the Cabul Darya and also an important station on the North-West railroad, which leads thence to the capital of the Punjab, Lahore. At Attock there is a bridge-of-boats over the Indus.

In this way the Peshawur circle is surrounded on all sides by English forts, and might form, to a certain extent, an independent theatre of war even if an insurrection also broke out in India, while an external enemy moved from the Afghan dominions and from Kafiristan. But the town of Peshawur, which has as many as 60,000 inhabitants and forms the focus of the English military forces, has not altogether a central position in this plain. The town is situated far nearer the Southern than the Northern extremity, and the English have, therefore, established to the North-East of the city, on the very bank of the Cabul Darya, a special camp, where the troops, forming the reserve of the defensive line of forts, are always stationed when not prevented by the cold of the winter or the heat of the summer, which, at a latitude of 34° and at an elevation of 1,100 feet above the level of the sea, are very burdensome and produce many sicknesses amongst the troops. Indeed although, in order

to diminish the number of the sick, the detachment which occupies the camp in the summer, consists generally of sepoys, natives of India, it is nevertheless necessary to change them from time to time. The number of British troops in the whole of the Peshawur circle is one regiment of infantry (1,500 men), while the remainder (2,300) consist of sepoys, but of course, in the event of war, this important strategical point would be occupied by stronger detachments, with a preponderance of European troops. Peshawur with its neighbouring forts forms the most advanced, and, it may be added, most important part of the North-Western military frontier of India: but this frontier stretches thence both to the North and to the South. The necessity for protecting the peaceable inhabitants of the valley of the Indus from the raids of the neighbouring nomad and settled mountaineers—Beloochees, Pathans, Wuzeerees, Yusufzais, Dards—has compelled the English to construct a system of defensive posts along the entire foot of the Soleyman range, and the other heights which fringe the plain of Sind on the West. Between these defensive posts the following towns are deserving of particular attention as being the centres of administration and of the reserve forces—Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazee Khan, Jacobabad and Hyderabad. The two last-named are situated within Lower Sind, and consequently in a military respect are under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army. With regard to the Punjab like all the troops to the number of as many as twelve and a half thousand, who occupy the frontier posts, are subordinate to the Government of the Punjab

so far as demands upon their services are concerned, while as regards their general management, they form a portion of the Bengal army. These "line" troops consist exclusively of natives, namely, nine thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, with the addition of only a few hundred English artillery men. But besides the garrisons in the forts and posts, there are also stationed in the Punjab a considerable number of field troops for the purpose of strengthening the defences on the North-West: such are the Lahore and Rawulpinnee divisions, in which there are more than seven thousand native and nearly six thousand European soldiers. The Punjab, being distinguished by a comparatively moderate climate, is chosen, as a rule, for the concentration of large masses of troops from the whole of the Northern half of India for manœuvring purposes and field exercises (in 1872-73 the camp was at Hussan Abdal).

Lord Napier of Magdala is actively occupying himself in bringing to perfection the whole Punjab military line, and apparently it may be said that, at the present time, all that necessity demanded has been done in the way of securing this frontier from the Beloochees, Pathans, Wuzeerees and Yusufzais. The raids of these mountain robbers have become so insignificant as to be limited to carrying off a few camels, sheep or horses. With regard, on the other hand, to defences against the great enemy of the Anglo-Asiatic power—the efforts of the natives of India to gain their national freedom, and the enmity on the part of Mussulmans towards the Christians, which is heartily supported by the Trans-Indus fanatics—against this enemy all possible lines are completely powerless. We remark in conclusion that

from a military point of view, the steam navigation which exist on the Indus is of great significance in order to connect the different parts of the Punjab and Sind Frontier, while, with the opening of the railroad from Mooltan to Hyderabad, the southern half of this border (as much as 900 versts in length) will gain a still firmer connection.

*"The Passes of Khyber, Khoord Cabul and Bamian."*—The prominent position of Peshawur, judging from the map, would facilitate very considerably any military operations which the English might undertake in the direction of Cabul, or even the further side of the Hindu Kush, where of late years they have contemplated forming a neutral zone of the lands belonging to their vassal the Ameer of Afghanistan. The protection of this zone, the extreme northerly point of which is not situated at a greater distance in a straight line from Peshawur than 400 versts, appears at first sight by no means difficult. An advance, moreover, into Afghanistan, to maintain there not only political influence, but also direct authority, would also at first sight be attended by no difficulties. In reality, however, the prosecution of all these objects presents one of the most difficult strategical problems, so that the East Indian Press has arrived at an almost unanimous conclusion that British troops ought not to advance beyond the Khyber Pass, which is situated only twenty-three versts to the west of Peshawur, and should, in the opinion of Anglo-Indian strategists, serve as a Thermopylae for every Xerxes who might contemplate penetrating into Hindustan along the Cabul Darya. In order to understand such a conclusion, it is necessary

to have some acquaintance with the geography and ethnography of the region along the Cabul Darya."

Here follows a brief description of the Khyber Pass and of that of Khoord Cabul.

The author continues:—

"The total distance from Peshawur to Cabul extends to 290 versts, and it should be added that the plain of Jelalabad affords a locality very suitable for the construction of an intermediate *étappe*. But in view of the difficulties which troops would meet in the ravines of the Khyber and Khoord Cabul, and a whole series of defiles of lesser dimensions in the branches of the Sufed Koh mountains, it may be said that to march over these 290 versts would cost the English army (if a fresh occupation of Cabul were in contemplation) enormous losses, especially since at the present time the warlike Afghans are better armed and better organized than they were in 1842, while the Ameer Shere Ali, not over-confident in the assistance of the 'friendly' Government of Calcutta, has introduced in Cabul a manufactory for arms where breech-loading rifles are prepared. It is this inaccessibility of Cabul that compels in a peculiar decree English strategists to turn their eyes to Quetta, whence it would be possible to leave Cabul and also the Hindu Kush on the East, and to appear at Herat and also in Turcomania, without undergoing the difficulties and dangers of a march on to the present capital of Afghanistan.

"However, Cabul and the mountain town of Bamian, to the North-West of the former, have served more than once as *étappes* for the bands of Asiatic conquerors

who broke into India. The possession of these towns, as being points which command one of the best passes through the Hindu Kush, that of Haji Khak, ought therefore to be one of the most important objects of the English army, if the latter should at any time contemplate (in view of attack or defence) crossing over to the northern slope of the Hindu Kush and marching into the basin of the Amu Darya. Hence, while examining the route to the West of the Indus along the Cabul Darya, it is necessary to glance also at its prolongation to the North-West. Practically it is well known that the Bamian defile is passable for pieces of field artillery without unshipping the guns, as was proved in 1841, when Brigadier Denny marched beyond the Hindu Kush, and as still happens at the present time when Afghan troops are despatched to Balkh, Khulm and Kunduz. The difficulty here, too, consists more in the predatory and warlike population of the region—Afghans and Hazarabs,—and not in the configuration of the locality, though nature interposes far greater obstacles than in the Khyber defile. On the two great passes—Unae (10,600 feet) and Haji Khak (12,300)—the snow lies during at least five months in wide streaks, while the Haji Khak is partially covered with snow the whole year round. Snow storms render journeys across the mountains in the winter not otherwise than dangerous even for lightly equipped horsemen, while the movement of caravans and military transports at that period of the year is absolutely impossible. And thus, if the English army, for some reason or other, were to move *via* Cabul across the Hindu Kush, the probability of its destruction in the basin of the Amu

Darya, or perhaps even at an earlier stage, is far greater than the chance of victory, or still more of permanent, prolonged success. To have in one's rear the defiles of Karakotal, Haji Khak, Una, Khoord Cabul, and the Khyber, to be at a distance of 500 versts from Peshawur, the basis of operations, and to find one self in the midst of a population whose predatory inclinations are well known,—all this constitutes a risk which no prudent commander would care to undergo.

“ Peshawur, however, might serve as a starting point to the basin of the Amu Darya, not only in a North-Westerly direction by Bamian and Khulm, but also by a route leading directly to the North *via* Chitral and Budukshan, which we proceed to examine.

“ *Chitral and Budukshan.*—Long before the subjugation of the Punjab, as early as the year 1820, the English began to busy themselves about collecting accurate data regarding not only the regions lying directly on the right bank of the Indus, but also regarding those situated outside the basin of that river, on the far side of the Hindu Kush, and especially on the upper waters of the Amu Darya. Their first agents on this career, Moorcroft and Trebek (1824), lost their lives in such an attempt: afterwards Burnes (1832) and Wood (1837) were more fortunate; but Stoddart and Conolly (1841) again fell victims—this time to the hand of the executioner—on the Northern side of the Amu Darya. This warning, which happened almost contemporaneously with the extirpation of the British army in the pass of Khoord Cabul, for a long time lessened the ardour of English geographers for visiting the regions to the

North-West of India, and it is only recently that a new series of explorations has commenced in Upper Asia from the side of Hindustan. The reports of these explorations also disclose the names of some martyrs to science (Shlagintweit, Hayward), but generally the results of English Trans-Himalayan travels have been successful. With regard, on the other hand, to the Hindu Kush, not only to the North, but also to the South, in Kafiristan, the East Indian Government has not despatched a single European up to the present time. Instead of Europeans, a series of natives, instructed in surveying, and sometimes in taking altitudes for the purpose of defining latitudes, have been despatched to the basins of the rivers Kunar, Amu Darya and Tarim. Such were Mahomed Hamid, Faiz Buksh, Mirza Shujah, the Havildar and many others, whom the head of the Trans-Himalayan Surveys, Major Montgomerie, simply designates by numbers, in order of course not to disclose their names.

“Of these Agents Mirza Shujah and the Havildar succeeded in penetrating from Peshawur into Budukshan, and procuring interesting particulars (which afterwards afforded a pretext for the solicitations of English official circles and the press) both about that town and also the routes leading to it. From a military point of view, the account of the Havildar is especially interesting, inasmuch as he journeyed by the shortest of all the routes between British India and the upper waters of the Oxus.”

Colonel Venukof inserts here an account of the Havildar’s journey, which is not translated, as it may be found in full in Vol. XLII of the Journal of the

Royal Geographical Society, 1872. The description concludes thus:—

“This route, generally speaking, proved to be far from easy, as also the return route *via* the pass of Dara (18,000 feet) situated in the Hindu Kush somewhat more to the West than that of Nuksan. In consequence of this the English have apparently at the present time become convinced that their influence cannot be extended by this road over the head waters of the Amu Darya. In order, on the other hand, to gain such an object, an effort has been recently made in another direction, by the pass of Darkot, which leads from the upper waters of the Indus, *via* Gilgit, into Wakhan, but we shall devote a special article to this route.”

*Routes from India via Dardistan and Baltistan.*—The itinerary of the Havildar includes a series of most important and well-known routes from India to the further side of the Hindu Kush from the Punjab. Proceeding further to the North and East along the frontiers of British India, we enter the dominions of the Maharaja of Cashmere and also the highland region of the Himalayas. The approaches from India to the North and North-West through these localities are attended with greater difficulty, because the Himalayas are more lofty than the mountains of Afghanistan and Beloochistan. Besides this the geography and ethnography of these regions, in spite of the explorations of Strachey, Cunningham, Thomson, Hayward, Leitner, Drew, and others, are as yet so incomplete that it is necessary to await a whole series of further expeditions in order to construct a decent map both of Baltistan and

especially of Dardistan and of the lands on the upper waters of the left affluents of the Yarkund Darya. Very many data however will probably be published before long, when the labours of Gordon, Trotter, Biddulph, Chapman, Bellew, and the other members of Forsyth's Kashgar expedition see the light.

At the present time a traveller wishing to penetrate from India into the basin of the Oxus or the Tarim *via* Cashmere selects usually Lahore as the point of his departure, and thence proceeds to Jummoo, the winter residence of the Maharaja of Cashmere, which has become of late years, in all respects, the capital of Cashmere since the town of Srinuggur has been abandoned and partly destroyed in consequence of the religious collisions between the Shias and Sunnis in the year 1872.

As far as Jummoo (120 versts) the road proceeds along a level or only slightly undulating region, but afterwards the traveller enters the outlying hillocks of the Himalayas and is obliged first of all to cross a ridge in the mountains, which surround the valley of Cashmere, by a very indifferent road, over the pass of Banihal, more than 10,000 feet in altitude. Hence a gradual descent, partly along the mountains, partly along the valley of the Jhelum, leads to Srinuggur, which lies in the centre of a somewhat extensive plain at an altitude of 5,200 feet above the sea level, and at a distance of 280 versts from Lahore. Srinuggur is the usual halting place for travellers and caravans, proceeding further to the North or North-East, but to what extent it is possible to penetrate thence directly to the North-West into Dardistan, we do not know, since

the direct route thither lies through what is at present a *terra incognita*, where even the course of the Indus continues to be marked on the maps by guesswork. The shortest route to Gilgit, and thence to the Pamir, leads *via* Skardo on the Indus, where the bed of this river is surrounded by enormous mountains. The road to Skardo from Srinuggur leads *via* the Zoji Pass (11,300 feet) into the valley of the river Dras, afterwards, from the village of Tarkat, along the left bank of the Indus, and owing to the unevenness of the locality, reaches a length of 220 versts, although the direct distance between the two extreme points does not exceed 110 versts. Skardo (7,200 feet above the sea level) is the most considerable populated point of Baltistan, with a fort, built on a high and entirely perpendicular rock, so that its occupation is the most important step towards taking a firm and permanent hold of the region. Proceeding thence to the North-West by a difficult road along the river, the traveller, after journeying 90 versts, reaches the ferry across the Indus near Bunji, and crossing that river enters the northern part of Dardistan, the central point of which is Gilgit (5,000 feet above the sea). This is the route taken by Mr. Hayward who penetrated even further to the North-West beyond Yassin (7,700 feet), but was killed by the orders of Meer Wullee of Yassin. In 1873 a Russian traveller named Pashino visited these places, but he did not succeed in reaching the pass of Darkot, which leads in the direction of the upper waters of the Oxus. In 1874 explorations were made by the English in the direction of Darkot from the North, from the banks of the Surkhab,\*

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\* (In the original Sarkhyad. *Trs.*)

but the results have not yet been published. In any case a traveller, intending to proceed from India to the upper waters of the Amu Darya by this route, would have to accomplish no less than three large mountain passes, and to travel throughout by narrow valleys where communications are only possible by means of mules, or also, according to M. Pachino's account, by means of coolies who carry baskets especially made for that purpose. Regarding the possibility of marching troops here in the absence of the friendly co-operation of the people of Baltistan and of the Dards, it is idle even to think, and it is therefore impossible to regard seriously the route *via* Gilgit as a strategical line from India on the North-West into the basin of the Aral Sea.

To the East of Gilgit, on the right bank of the Indus opposite its extreme bend on the North, hang the enormous masses of the Himalayas, reaching a height of 25,000 feet and more above the level of the sea (Haramosh 24,285, Rakipushi 25,000 feet) clad in perpetual snow and with glaciers, 60 to 70 versts in length. These mountains are completely inaccessible, and form a group between the upper waters of the affluents of the Indus, the Oxus, and the Yarkund Darya. The population here is very sparse, and it is only by circumventing the mountains from the West, that it is possible to approach the passes of Gundrab and Kalik, leading in the direction of Tash-Kurgan or Sarikol which is situated on the tableland of the Pamir; but even these passes form as yet only a geographical hypothesis, as no European has visited them. Hence it seems strange that of late some projectors have

begun to speak about a railway from India to the Russo-Asiatic dominions *via* the Pamir. This proposition is, to say the least, as strange as that of connecting Hindustan with Kashgar by rail *via* Ladak, in one of the directions regarding which we shall speak in the next article.

*Ladak and Yarkund.*—Of all the routes to the trans-mountain regions on the North-West of India, those which lead to Eastern Turkestan are, of course, the least likely to be used for military movements. At all events up to the present time such movements have never been recorded on the page of history, in spite of the charms which such an ingress into India must have had for Central Asian conquerors from the North. The reason is to be found in the difficulty of access of the mountains, which rise in a wide zone between the plains of the Punjab and those of Eastern Turkestan. In order to show at a glance the difficulty of crossing these mountains, we append the following table of the heights of the seven mountain chains which lie between Jummoo, the southern capital of the Maharaja of Cashmere, and Yarkund, to circumvent which it is impossible :—

	Feet.
Banihal, on the South-East of Srinuggur...	10,000
Zoji, on the North-East of Srinuggur ...	11,000
Khardung, north of Ladak ...	17,574
Sasseer, between the Nubra and the Shayok	17,982
Karakorum, which divides the river systems of the Indus and the Tarim ..	18,317
Suget, to the South of Shahidulla ...	18,237
Kilian ... . . . . .	16,000

It is possible, of course, to choose some other itinerary in order to avoid the passes above mentioned, but

at the same time neither the number of the passes nor the heights to be traversed would in this way be at all diminished. Thus it is possible to go from Jummoo to Ladak missing Srinuggur, and consequently to leave on one side the passes of Banihal and Zoji, in which case four passes have to be crossed instead of two, *viz.*, Badanvar,\* Sach, Umasi, and Singi. Similarly also from Simla, in the direction of Ladak there are no less than two large passes—Rotal and Bara-lacha (16,625 feet). Ladak, on the other hand, is the unavoidable point of meeting for all the routes between Eastern Turkestan and India.

This small town, as is well known, is situated on the right side of the upper course of the Indus at some distance from the river bank, at an elevation of 11,278 feet above the level of the sea, and at the foot of mountains far exceeding 18,000 feet in height. There are not more than 3 or 4,000 permanent inhabitants; but, on the other hand, there are always many strange merchants and servants of caravans, who are the more numerous since the transport of goods everywhere in the Western Himalayas is accomplished not on camels, which are unable to stand the rocky mountain roads, but on mulcs, which instead of sixteen carry a burden of only five puds, and require many drivers. Extending almost exclusively along only one street Ladak has good bazaars: the climate is distinguished, in spite of the snowy winter, by unusual salubrity, and hence visitors from the North and South gladly make it a resting-point. The English Government maintains at Ladak a special agent, whose duty it is to protect the

interests of Indian subjects and of the Calcutta Government, because at Ladak the officials of the Maharaaja of Cashmere value goods, on transit from India into Central Asia, and calculate according to their valuation the customs duty which the English pay to the Cashmere treasury. Regarding the routes to the north of Ladak, to Yarkund, the most circumstantial information is procurable from Hayward, Henderson and Forsyth. The first says:—

There are several roads between the two towns named. The first and most westerly proceeds at first by the Khardung pass on the river Shayok near Disket, thence in an upper direction along the Nubra to Changlung and afterwards by the Sassee pass again into the valley of the Shayok, along which the road proceeds as far as the very foot of the Karakorum pass, by which the traveller penetrates into the basin of the Yarkund Darya. This is called the Zamistani (winter) route, and leads to Yarkund *via* the pass of Yangi Davan and the little town of Kugiar. The second or Tabistani (summer) route proceeds at first from Ladak to the East *via* the pass of Digar La towards the Shayok, and afterwards in a northerly direction to the Karakorum pass, whence it continues to Shahidulla and Sanju, thereby touching the river Karakash. Here to the North of the Karakorum there still remain to be crossed the passes of Suget and Sanju (16,612 feet). The third road lies still further to the East in the direction of Chang Chenmo, and was first traversed by Hayward, at the same time that another English traveller, Shaw, directed his steps in the direction of the Sassee and Karakorum. This

route leads across the passes of Chan La (18,389) and Marsemik (18,457) on to the high tableland of Lingzi Thang (15,000—16,000 feet), and thence crossing the passes of Kizil (18,800) and Karatagh (18,000), it joins with the second road about the head waters of the Yarkund Darya. The distance from Ladak to Yarkund by the first or Zamistani route is 700 versts, by the second or Tabistani route 720, and by the Chang Chenmo 760 versts. In order to avoid the barren waste of Lingzi Thang, it is possible to proceed directly to the upper waters of the Karakash from Chang Chenmo, in which case the route is more mountainous and, instead of the Kizil pass, several other passes have to be crossed: for example, Samdo, 17,800 feet in height.

These data have been borrowed from Hayward and Henderson. In one of his reports on the progress of the Kashgar expedition of 1873-74, Forsyth says:

Some people have supposed of late that it is only necessary to choose such a route across the Himalayas as will steer clear of the Karakorum pass (entirely inaccessible in winter) in order to avoid meeting at any point any serious obstacles. On the contrary, people intending to despatch caravans ought to be made aware of the fact that the road is everywhere bad. The most easterly route, as is well known, leads *via* Chang Chenmo: here it is necessary to cross the Chan La pass, the valley of Lake Pangong (13,900), the Marsemik pass, the mountain valley of Chang Chenmo, from which by means of a pass 18,800 feet in height the traveller reaches the mountain plateaus of Lingzi Thang and Thaldat, the altitudes of which are respectively 17,000 and 16,000 feet above the sea level: in a

word, the route lies uniformly over a region exceeding Mount Blanc in altitude, which is moreover rocky and in the greater part a wilderness. The road ultimately meets the river Karakash,\* and descending along it, reaches the Kashgarian outpost of Shahidulla, which is situated at an altitude of as much as 11,500 feet, and is separated from the Yarkund plain by the passes of Sanju or Kilian, the height of each of which is 16,000 feet. Out of the twenty-six marches from Ladak to Shahidulla, on ten water and fuel are scarce, while on eight both are entirely wanting. It is, as a rule, difficult to procure water, and where it is procurable it is unpleasant to the taste. The better of the other routes is that *via* Chang Chenmo and the passes of Kizil and Karatagh, which has been explored in detail by Dr. Cayley. On this route, in 1870, a Yarkund merchant, Gul Murad, brought to Ladak fifteen camels in complete safety, whereas on all the other routes it is necessary to have yaks or mules. However, in the middle of summer, it is best to proceed across the Karakorum, since this route shortens the distance by six marches; but even here, in spite of several improvements to the road effected by the Maharaja of Cashmere, which lessen the difficulties of the passage, it is necessary to traverse an uninhabited wilderness during at least eleven days.

These data are apparently sufficient to convince one that military movements from India into Eastern

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\* Forsyth refers to the northern branch of the Chang Chenmo road, which leads through a plain covered with water to the North of the Yangra pass, and stretches afterwards along the river Karakash to Shahidulla, which it approaches from the East.

Turkestan, or *vice-versâ*, are barely possible. Nevertheless, the route from Ladak to Yarkund has no small strategical importance for the English in India. By means of it they supply Yacoob Beg of Kashgar with arms for his struggle with China, the weakening of which latter power is the perpetual object of British policy. On the other hand, Yacoob Beg can make use of these arms for other purposes, producing warlike disturbances in the highlands of Central Asia, which are always advantageous to the English.

We add, in conclusion, that, independently of the roads in the direction of Yarkund, there is a route from Ladak to another town of Eastern Turkistan, namely, Khotan. Proceeding first along the tableland of Lingzi Thang it falls in with the third route to Yarkund, but afterwards turns to the North-East and North, passing by the lakes Tsothang (17,000) and Thaldat (16,000) to the passes of Yangra (15,300) and Yangi-davan (15,500). After the last pass, near Tash, the road proceeds along gold-containing vallies, and afterwards rises on to the first chain of the Kuen Lun, the summits of which reach here a height of 19,000 feet, while the ridge, which serves as a pass, is as high as 15,500 feet. Still further to the North is found a second chain of the Kuen Lun, with the pass of Naia Khan, 18,660 feet in altitude, while afterwards in the basin of the Khotan river there are two more passes, across the northern branches of the same mountain system, Kapas (10,650 feet) and Bisha-davar (10,400 feet). In this way the route towards Khotan appears no less difficult than that to Yarkund; indeed, the number of passes over the former is larger. The

total distance from Ladak to Khotan is not less than 600 versts, although the latter town is situated more than a degree to the south of Yarkund.

Here we conclude our series of notices regarding the routes from India on the West and North, which, owing to the march of political events, are, at the present time, gaining such vital importance not only for the English dominions in Hindustan, but also for Central Asia, and consequently for our fatherland.

*Roads from India to China.*—The question regarding the routes from the Anglo-Indian dominions to the Chinese provinces of Se-chuan and Yunan, whither the English are most anxious to penetrate in order to extend the market of their cotton goods, and especially of East Indian opium, has latterly acquired an important political significance. A series of expeditions has been equipped in order to open up these much-desired lines for trade, but hitherto all such efforts have failed of success. The chief difficulty consists in the high mountains which lie on the shortest route between Upper Assam and the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang.

These mountains, peopled as they are by the warlike tribe of Mishmis, are so inaccessible that in spite of the distance from Suddya in Assam to Batang in China being no greater than 400 versts, there is not even a hope of opening out at any future time trade communications between these two points. The Englishman Cooper, who in 1868, repeatedly endeavoured to cross this mass of mountains from the East, was compelled to abandon his intention, and to turn from Batang directly to the South, to Aten-tze and Weesee, whence however the

Chinese compelled him to retrace his steps. Richthofen states that he also thought of trying to proceed by this same route, but of course gave up the project. In this way the idea of a route between the Brahmaputra and the Yang-tse has now been abandoned as futile: but the English have of late years commenced to busy themselves with great perseverance to connect the Yang-tse with the Irrawady, the lower course of which irrigates British Burma. The first and most successful expedition in this direction was carried out in 1868 by the English Resident at Bhamo,\* Major Sladen, who, accompanied by Dr. Anderson and Lieutenant Bowers, succeeded in reaching Momein, which is situated in Chinese territory, although to the West not only of the Yang-tse and the Lang-tsan, but also of the Salween, a large river at the mouth of which lies Moulmein, well known for its trade in teak. Sladen found that the route from Bhamo, which town is situated at an altitude of not more than 500 feet above the level of the sea, rapidly ascends, so that Momein, which lies at the sources of the Tapeng, an affluent of the Irrawady, is situated at an elevation of as much as 5,800 feet. Further he found the road opening out towards Talifoo, by which Margary proceeded during the present year without difficulty, but this road Sladen did not succeed in examining. On his journey, which was 180 versts in length, he met, in addition to Burmese, comparatively few in number, Shans,—a peculiar tribe of mixed origin, who are divided into branches, governed by hereditary Chiefs—while in the mountains near Momein, besides the above,

\* Should be Mandalay. *Trs.*)

Kakhyens were found, connected in origin with the Singphoos of Assam. The greatest part of the population however consisted of Chinese, who even in Bhamo itself preponderate over the other tribes. By Sladen's route, and partly to the South of it, Colonel Browne's expedition in the beginning of 1875 proceeded in two columns for a distance of about 30\* versts, to meet which expedition Margary, who had successfully journeyed through the whole of China, was making his way. It is well known that this expedition was forced to turn back, and at the same time also lost nearly the whole of its baggage train. Who was to blame for this want of success it is not yet possible to determine, but it is so far clear that the Chinese may be implicated equally with the semi-savage Kakhyens or Shans, or lastly the Burmese themselves, for the last-named did not naturally regard with any special favour a road being opened through the region by those very natives† who had already taken from them the best half of their country.

The third route from British India to Yunan leads from the capital of the Burmese Empire, Mandalay. It is less mountainous than that before mentioned, but also proceeds through wooded elevations and leads ~~out~~ Theinni and Shunning to Talifoo. That portion of it, nearest to Mandalay has been examined by the English, but the greater part remains unexplored, and the well-known English geographer Yule expresses regret that Colonel Browne did not choose it as the road for his expedition.

<sup>\*</sup> (sic in original. Trs.)  
† (sic in original. The author apparently refers to the English. Trs.)

Lastly, a fourth road, the most southerly, leads from Moulmein to Yunan-fu *vid* Zimmay in Siamese territory, and Tan\* and Hon\* in Burma. The northern part of this road was traversed by the French expedition of Lagrée, while the southern has been passed over by the English traveller Macleod. This road is not only very long but is mountainous, and, what is most important, pack-animals are at all times indispensable, as there is not a single navigable river along the whole route. This want is to some extent supplied on the route from Talikant to Tan (which is at right angles to that already mentioned, and has only been traversed by Cushing)†, inasmuch as it commences at the Salween at a distance of 500 versts to the North of Moulmein.

Regarding the roads from India to Chinese territory *vid* Thibet there is no necessity to speak, because they are scarcely accessible even for solitary horsemen and small caravans. At the same time, in the event of a war with China, England would naturally prefer to attack the enemy by the sea, for which purpose her extensive seaboard station at Hong-Kong and her fleet consisting of thirty-five vessels of war, afford ample means.

\* (Probably *Kiang-Tung* and *Kiang-Hung*. *Trs.*)

† (I have failed to identify these names. *Trs.*)





